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Is the French presidential election a referendum on EU 
membership ? 
Olivier Costa
European integration has never been a central theme 
in French political debates, let alone during the 
presidential election campaigns. Paradoxically, while 
foreign policy - and therefore European policy - is 
largely the President’s responsibility, the candidates 
are not very loquacious on the subject. However, this 
year, European issues have emerged as the backdrop 
of the campaign, in a context of rising populism and 
euro-scepticism on a continental scale. France's 
relationship with the EU leads to little clearly argued 
discussions or precise proposals, but it created a 
fundamental dividing line amongst the candidates, in 
a globally Eurosceptic context. 
The reasons behind the candidates’ lack of interest in 
the EU 
The European issue is generally less prominent in the 
founding countries of the European Community than in 
the more recent member states: EU membership 
appears obvious to them, and public action seems to be 
irremediably Europeanized. In France, however, 
European issues are not particularly present, and 
especially not during campaigns for the presidential 
elections. The presidential function is directly linked to 
the idea of French sovereignty: the President is 
considered as the leader of a major actor in 
international relations, sitting on the UN Security 
Council and owning nuclear weapons. It is therefore 
difficult for the candidates to admit that the country is 
closely intertwined to a supranational structure whose 
influence is felt in most areas of public action, and that 
France may be required to respect EU institutions’ 
decisions, even when French representatives were 
opposed to them. This acknowledgement of 
powerlessness is usually confessed later by the 
President-elect, when it seems appropriate for him to 
explain why 'Brussels' prevents the fulfilment of certain 
electoral promises.  
The two main French political families are also reluctant 
to take a stand on European issues. On the right, the 
conservatives [RPR, then UMP and today Les 
Républicains (LR)] have always been divided between a 
sovereigntist wing, attached to a Gaullian – and thus 
intergovernmental – conception of European 
construction, and a more liberal wing, accommodating 
the Community method. This political cleavage has led 
to deep divisions at certain moments in history, such as 
the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) or the 
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addressed in French political debates. They 
are all the less present in 2017, due to the 
campaign’s main focus on current legal cases 
and the ongoing political reconfigurations. 
> However, Europe is one of the fundamental 
dividing lines of the campaign. The majority 
of the 11 candidates have developed a highly 
Eurosceptic discourse. Only Emmanuel 
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Hamon (PS) have adopted a moderate 
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arguments behind this rejection appear 
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only the first step in a longer electoral 
sequence: it will be followed by equally 
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Constitutional Treaty (2005). On the left, the French 
Socialist Party (PS) has always been divided on the 
European issue. In the European Parliament, since the 
early 1950s, the French PS members have regularly 
been among the most critical. François Mitterrand 
imposed a ‘pro-European’ line in 1983, but the Socialist 
Party’s united front had already been cracked during 
the referendum campaign on the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty and then shattered to pieces with the 
referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. 
Since then, the PS has been deeply divided between the 
partisans and opponents of European integration. The 
former, often referred to as ‘social-liberals’, are in 
favour of the EU’s institutions and policies. The latter, 
who have opposed François Hollande’s policy since his 
election, have a critical approach to the Union, which is 
considered too liberal and too prone to limit public 
spending. In both parties, the European issue thus 
provokes cleavages which can only be overcome by 
silencing it. The other parties do not have this difficulty. 
France thus presents a political spectrum where 
virulent Euroscepticism reigns at the extremes, as well 
as on the left and on the right, where the centre (Left 
Radicals, Greens, Modem, UDI) is strongly Pro-
European, and where the two main political parties (PS 
and LR) each ensure, through their internal divisions, a 
form of continuity between pro- and anti-European. 
An unclear electoral campaign 
Beyond the candidates’ limited interest in European 
issues and the lack of appetite of French journalists for 
the subject, the 2017 presidential campaign left only a 
limited place for a substantive debate on the major 
political themes. This campaign has indeed 
distinguished itself by its great confusion. 
The legal troubles of two main candidates have largely 
mobilised the media. Indeed, François Fillon (LR) has 
been the subject of various charges relating to the 
fictitious employment of his relatives, and Marine Le 
Pen (FN) has been sued for the misappropriation of 
staffing resources allocated her political group by the 
European Parliament. 
On the left, the situation was no less confused: the 
primary elections which led to the designation of Benoît 
Hamon (PS), has indeed aroused irreconcilable 
divergences. Some of the PS militants and elected 
officials chose to rally the candidacy of Emmanuel 
Macron, the former Minister of Economic Affairs, who 
runs as an independent candidate (En Marche!), with a 
centrist position. Other members of the PS turned to 
Jean-Luc Mélenchon (La France Insoumise), the 
candidate of a more radical left. This situation explains 
the harsh criticisms between the three main left-wing 
candidates throughout the campaign, and did not allow 
them to focus on their programmatic options. 
Lastly, the April 2016 amendment to the presidential 
election rules did not reduce the number of contenders, 
which is in line with previous elections. In addition to 
the five candidates already mentioned, there are 
another six candidates from marginal groups : Nicolas 
Dupont-Aignan (Debout la France) proposes a 
conservative and a sovereignist direction; Nathalie 
Arthaud (Lutte Ouvrière) and Philippe Poutou (Nouveau 
Parti Anticapitaliste) embody two nuances of the 
extreme left; Jacques Cheminade (Solidarité & Progrès) 
is in the wake of American politician Lyndon Larouche, 
with an ‘altruistic protectionist’ program that is difficult 
to classify; Jean Lassalle (Resistons!) is a centrist 
candidate, with an atypical profile; finally, François 
Asselineau (Union Populaire Républicaine) is a 
nationalist and radically anti-European. The rules 
designed to ensure an equal access to the media for all 
candidates adds to the confusion, by placing on equal 
footing representatives of political parties with 
hundreds of parliamentarians, and those of small 
groups, sometimes having no real political presence. 
Europe in the prism of populism 
Europe has, nevertheless, had its place in the 
presidential campaign, but in a rather peculiar way. It 
should first be noted that all the candidates, with the 
exception of Emmanuel Macron, had spoken out 
against the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty. 
Moreover, for those who were already in politics, they 
had also rejected the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty. Criticism towards the EU thus appeared as a kind 
of constant in the campaign. During the televised 
debate which brought together the 11 candidates on 4 
April 2017 (BFMTV and CNews), the EU was therefore 
subjected to an outpour of hostile statements. 
No less than five of the 11 candidates defend positions 
implying explicitly or implicitly a French exit from the EU 
in the name of restoring France’s sovereignty, and 
rejecting the EU vision of the economy or of society. 
These five candidates are: François Asselineau, Marine 
Le Pen, Philippe Poutou, Nicolas Dupont Aignan and 
Jacques Cheminade. The other six are less radical, but 
not necessarily less critical. Nathalie Arthaud 
denounces, like Philippe Poutou, European integration 
as a system in the hands of the financial powers, but 
contemplates the possibility of a reversal of logic, 
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notably within the framework of an alliance between 
France and southern European countries. Jean-Luc 
Mélenchon and Benoît Hamon share the hope that 
European integration can be reoriented towards 
recovery through growth and investment. Mélenchon 
has long condemned the excesses of liberal European 
integration and called to reject austerity policies and 
leave the Euro. Hamon said he was in favour of 
European integration and benefited from the 
withdrawal of Yannick Jadot, the candidate 
representing the green pro-European ‘Europe 
écologie/Les Verts’ party. However, he dismissed the 
Maastricht Treaty as well as the Constitutional Treaty 
and promotes a treaty aimed at the “democratization” 
of the EU  which draws a stern assessment of its 
functioning. François Fillon also said he was in favour of 
European integration. He nevertheless comes from the 
EU-critical branch of his political family and advocates a 
very intergovernmental approach, relying heavily on 
the interactions between heads of state and 
government. He also focuses on security issues, and 
makes the reform of the Schengen agreements a 
priority. The centrist candidate Jean Lassalle refuses to 
take on the federalist heritage of his political family and, 
on the question of Europe – as on others – deploys a 
relatively confused discourse. Only Emmanuel Macron 
presents himself as clearly pro-European, and is 
convinced that the EU is the solution to the  difficulties 
that the countries facing, not their cause. Among all the 
candidates, he is also the only one to openly praise the 
virtues of the single market and of free movement for 
the French economy. 
A rejection of Europe’s populist essence 
The Eurosceptic feel that dominates the campaign is not 
specific to France, but reflects a rise of populism in all 
advanced democracies. In recent years, parties, 
movements or candidates have emerged throughout 
Europe, claiming to speak for the people and to flatter 
them by proposing radical and simplistic solutions to 
complex problems, and by designating the persons 
responsible for the evils that strike contemporary 
societies. This outbreak is not a coincidence: it results 
from a context of poly-crisis, but also from a loss of 
ideological benchmarks. Many citizens are now 
obsessed with fear of social, economic, political, 
cultural and environmental decline for themselves, 
their children and their country, and they no longer 
believe in a better future. Populist leaders are 
distinguished by their way of appealing, not to reason 
or ideology, but to feelings: fear of the future, hatred of 
foreigners, rejection of elites and institutions, and an 
exaggerated exaltation of the nation. The EU is accused 
of being the cause of immigration, of deindustrialization 
and social decline, the Trojan horse of globalization and 
multiculturalism, the promoter of absurd austerity and 
the dismantling of the welfare state. 
The success of the Eurosceptic and populist movements 
is not only a product of citizens’ anguish facing the 
future: it also results from the government parties’ 
inability to answer to citizens’ expectations, to renew 
their frameworks and discourses, and to surpass the 
narrow horizon of egotistic quarrels. The current 
campaign is a striking illustration of this, with, on one 
hand, the implosion of the PS, worn out by the exercise 
of power and its inability to resolve its ideological 
ambivalences, and on the other hand the announced 
defeat of Les Républicains, victim of conflicts of 
leadership and the hazardous ethics of its candidate. 
Throughout the campaign, populist and Eurosceptic 
candidates identified the EU as the main source of the 
difficulties that France has encountered in the 
economic, social, industrial or budgetary field. They 
have multiplied references to Brexit and the election of 
Donald Trump, and have presented the exit from the EU 
as a disruptive political event likely to give back a voice 
to ‘the people’ against ‘the establishment’. 
With this campaign, France has also entered the era of 
‘fake news’ and ‘alternative truths’. The criticisms of the 
EU pronounced by candidates of all stripes are based 
largely on fantasies, truncated arguments and invented 
figures. A high point was reached during the debate on 
4 April 2017, bringing together the 11 candidates, 
during which the most EU-critical multiplied these sort 
of claims – without ever being contradicted by their 
rivals or the journalists. 
Beyond rejection  
If one analyses more closely the candidates’ remarks 
and propositions, three constants emerge:  
• Europe is considered, by all, to be the solution or 
cause of the difficulties facing France, whether it 
be identity, economy, employment, defence, 
terrorism, migration, foreign trade or foreign 
policy more generally. Many candidates are 
animated by a kind of yearning for a time before 
globalization and European integration. Marine Le 
Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, and the small left-
wing and extreme-right candidates, want to leave 
the Union but also NATO and free trade 
agreements. Emmanuel Macron and Francois 
Fillon refuse nostalgia and retreat, and consider 
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that France must instead follow the example of its 
neighbours in order to reform and open up to the 
world. Benoît Hamon also advocates openness, but 
has declared, as a precondition, the necessity for a 
deep democratic reform of the European 
institutions. 
• Dialogue with Germany is a second point of 
common concern for all candidates: it is 
considered essential, even by those who advocate 
the withdrawal from the EU or who have 
developed a hostile discourse towards this key 
partner accused of imposing its migration policy, 
promoting budgetary austerity or pursuing a 
selfish economic and commercial policy. 
• The euro is a final subject of common interest and 
deep divisions. Eurosceptics believe that the euro 
is responsible for many of France’s troubles 
(relocations, unemployment, deficit, weak 
growth...) and therefore propose to leave the 
single currency. Hamon, Fillon and Macron, on the 
contrary, believe that the euro must be retained, 
but propose to change the euro zone governance. 
Conclusion: the campaign seen from a European 
perspective 
If European issues do not seem very central in the 
campaign, everywhere in Europe it is considered that 
the French presidential election will have a decisive 
impact on the future of the EU. More than ever, 
European integration is a two-level game whose 
dynamics are strongly conditioned by the vagaries of 
national political life. 
Among the federalists and in Brussels, the election of 
Emmanuel Macron is perceived as the possible first step 
towards a revival of European integration. They are led 
to hope that his election would be followed by the 
arrival of Martin Schulz at the German Chancellery in 
September, and that together these two leaders would 
take the major initiatives that the EU needs to get out 
of the rut. A possible success of François Fillon is 
apprehended as having less impact, as he is considered 
a man who has already been prime minister for five 
years. The comments relate more to his legal problems, 
and to what these say about French political life. The 
very critical positions of Jean-Luc Mélenchon are 
worrying, and it is surprising that a ‘Communist’ may 
have a chance of winning. 
But it is the possibility of the election of Marine Le Pen 
that attracts the most attention. In many countries 
there are concerns about the consequences of such an 
event, with the belief that it would stop European 
integration. Even if Mrs Le Pen does not have the 
political means to launch a formal withdrawal 
procedure from the EU, her ferocious euroscepticism 
would mark a halt to its functioning. While abstaining to 
interfere in the campaign, many European leaders have 
indicated that they refuse to meet the candidate. On 
the other hand, Brexit supporters were pleased with the 
possible success of the FN, hoping that a ‘Frexit’ would 
facilitate the negotiations of withdrawal of their own 
country. 
The possible success of the FN also raises concerns for 
domestic reasons, as many EU members are faced with 
the rise of populist or extremist parties. In Germany, the 
anti-refugee and eurosceptic AfD (Alternative für 
Deutschland) party could join the Bundestag in 
September. In Italy, there is a concern about the 
influence of the anti-system ‘Five Star Movement’ and 
the anti-immigration party ‘Northern League’. In the 
United Kingdom, there are worries that the nationalism 
that inspired the Brexit and the hard line of Theresa 
May’s government are paradoxically leading to the 
dismantling of the country. Watching Marine Le Pen fail 
– as we witnessed with Geert Wilders in the 
Netherlands and Norbert Hofer in Austria – would be a 
way of warding off the threat. 
The concern about Le Pen's score also stems from the 
fact that in countries that have a proportional or a one-
round majority system, the candidate who leads the 
first round is expected to win. This is not necessarily the 
case with a two-round majority vote, and Marine Le Pen 
has concretely little chance of being elected. In any 
case, the French presidential election is interesting as 
well as worrying because it is perceived as a referendum 
on France’s EU membership, given the almost certain 
presence of at least one Eurosceptic candidate in the 
second round. 
However, the presidential election is only the first step 
in a longer electoral sequence: just as its results are 
surrounded by uncertainty, with four candidates neck-
and-neck as we grow closer to the first round, the future 
president, whoever it is, will find it difficult to get a 
majority in the legislative elections that will follow. 
France will probably discover the joys of negotiating a 
coalition government agreement. In this context, 
European issues could become central – as a rallying 
point for several parties to the future President – or, on 
the contrary, be placed completely aside – as a theme 
that creates irreconcilable divisions. 
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